Revitalizing America’s Shipyards: A National Imperative

by Bart L. Denny, Ph.D.

America’s shipyards are in crisis. The U.S. Navy can't build or repair ships fast enough to meet today’s threats—thanks in part to the shortsighted closure of major public shipyards in the 1990s. Submarines like USS Boise have waited years for drydock space. China builds 50% of the world’s ships; we build just 1%. It’s time to invest in new public shipyards, expand public-private partnerships, and—if necessary—temporarily lean on our allies' shipyards. Revitalizing U.S. shipbuilding is no longer optional—it’s a matter of national security.

Below is an executive summary of a monograph I recently wrote concerning U.S. shipbuilding and repair. While my experience shapes my views and conclusions, the information I used to write this monograph is publicly available. The full monograph is available here.

The former Long Beach Naval Shipyard closed in the 1990s, costing the Navy repair capability it sorely needs today.

Executive Summary

The United States faces a maritime industrial crisis that directly threatens its ability to deter adversaries, maintain global naval presence, and respond to future conflicts. The U.S. Navy cannot build, maintain, or repair ships fast enough to meet its operational demands, particularly in light of growing threats from peer competitors like China. This monograph argues that a bold national strategy to revitalize America’s shipyards—public and private—is not only necessary but overdue.

Historical Context and Strategic Consequences

In the 1990s, the U.S. closed four major public naval shipyards—Philadelphia, Long Beach, Mare Island, and Charleston—as part of the post-Cold War Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. These closures were meant to save money but instead created long-term bottlenecks in naval shipbuilding and repair. Today, the Navy is left with only four public shipyards, all over a century old and operating beyond their intended capacity. The result is a national maintenance backlog so severe that USS Boise, a nuclear attack submarine, spent more than seven years pier-side awaiting an overhaul—highlighting a broader strategic vulnerability.

Compounding Challenges

• Delays in Ship Construction: The Navy cannot build submarines or surface combatants fast enough to replace aging vessels. Programs like the Virginia-class submarine, Constellation-class frigate, and Columbia-class SSBN face design delays, workforce shortages, and supplier bottlenecks.

• Programmatic Failures: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and Zumwalt-class destroyer programs were costly missteps, yielding minimal combat utility and contributing to a depleted and aging fleet.

• Workforce Shortages: Skilled tradespeople (e.g., welders, pipefitters, engineers) are in short supply. The Navy has launched partnerships like the Michigan Maritime Manufacturing Initiative (M3) to address this gap, but much more is needed.

• Global Asymmetry: China now builds 50% of the world’s ships; the U.S. builds only 1%. China has more than 20 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States—posing an existential threat to American maritime dominance.

Policy Response and Legislative Momentum

Recent initiatives signal growing awareness:

• The SHIPS for America Act proposes significant investments in maritime infrastructure, workforce development, and shipyard modernization.

• An Executive Order on Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance has called for a whole-of-government Maritime Action Plan.

• The U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps have jointly emphasized the urgency of expanding shipyard capacity in strategic documents like Advantage at Sea.

Recommended Courses of Action

This monograph proposes a three-pronged policy strategy:

1. Build New Public Shipyards

   • Construct one or more modern naval shipyards to increase maintenance and construction capacity.

   • Modeled after successful WWII-era efforts, this would reduce reliance on aging infrastructure and increase surge capability.

2. Expand Capacity via Public-Private Partnerships

   • Reactivate dormant facilities (e.g., Charleston, Philadelphia) and upgrade existing private shipyards through federal investment and shared infrastructure.

   • Leverage small and mid-size shipyards across the country for modular construction and support roles.

3. Leverage Allied Shipbuilding as a Stopgap

   • Temporarily use shipyards in Japan and South Korea for maintenance and auxiliary ship construction (as is already done by the Military Sealift Command).

   • Adapt legal frameworks to allow limited, time-bound overseas builds while rapidly scaling U.S. capabilities.

Conclusion

Revitalizing America’s shipyards is a strategic necessity, not a discretionary investment.  It will not come cheap or quick. The United States cannot afford to lose a war at sea because it failed to maintain, repair, or build ships in time. The 1990s decision to shutter major shipyards was a grave miscalculation—and unless corrected, it will continue to degrade national security.

A successful maritime industrial strategy must combine long-term infrastructure investment, immediate capacity boosts through partnerships, and judicious use of allied capabilities. These actions—though costly—are far cheaper than the price of strategic failure. If the United States is to maintain its naval superiority and protect its interests across the globe, the time to act is now.

About the Author

Dr. Bart L. Denny, PhD, is a retired U.S. naval officer whose career began as an enlisted nuclear reactor operator aboard two submarines—including a new-construction attack submarine. He was later commissioned and served as a division officer and department head on Spruance-class destroyers before commanding a Navy patrol ship during Operation Iraqi Freedom. He also served for several years on the staff of United States Central Command, contributing to operational planning and strategic initiatives across the Middle East. He holds multiple graduate degrees, including one in National Security Studies and one in Space Systems, and currently teaches graduate-level courses in leadership and organizational development. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect any official position.

Dr. Denny's full monograph is available here.